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7 January 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 1/80)



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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

SUCCESSFUL LAUNCHING OF MIRVED 'M4 MSBS' MISSILE

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 8 Dec 79 p 51

[Text] The Ministry of Defense has just announced, in its 29 November 1979 information bulletin, that last July there were three successful experimental launchings of the new French strategic ballistic missiles: "M20 MSBS" [MSBS = two-stage submarine-launched intermediate range ballistic missile], "M4 MSBS" and "S3 SSBS" [SSBS = two-stage intermediate range surface-to-surface silo-launched ballistic missile]. These launchings, according to the Ministry of Defense, "indicate the good working order of the missiles in use and under development for our nuclear forces." Specifically, this is the first time mention has been made of a successful launching of a mirved "M4 MSBS" missile.

The July launching of the S3 was a success, marking the final milestone of development of the S3 missile with which the installations of the Strategic Air Forces of the Plateau d'Albion will soon (between now and 1983) be equipped. The good results of this test have confirmed the results of previous experimental launchings. They have enabled favorable conclusions to be drawn as to the operational capabilities of the S3, its equipment and deployment procedures.

An M20 missile, identical to the ones which, from now on, are to be included on all missile-launching submarines of the Strategic Oceanic Force, was launched successfully from a submarine. This test makes more than ten consecutive successes in launching M20 missiles most of which were launched from submerged submarines.

The M4 system--an extended-range missile with multiple warheads --will be included on the SNLE [ballistic missile-launching nuclear submarines], beginning in 1985, gradually replacing the M20 system. An M20 missile with an M4-type warhead was launched so that a study could be made of the reentry into the atmosphere of the multiple heads of the M4 missile. This launching, which was preceded by two other experimental launchings in December and in April to study the spacing and the reentry of the M4 warheads, was successful. This test marks an important step in the perfecting of the M4 multiple warheads and their guidance system.

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It will be recalled that the Aerospatiale firm is the prime contractor for the "SSBS" and "MSBS" weapons systems, with the SEP [European Propellant Company] in charge of the propulsion systems of the missiles.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

NEW WAVE OF STUDENT RADICALS IS CORE OF GREEN MOVEMENT

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Dec 79 pp 107-108

[Article: "Green Cells--The New Radical Student Movement"]

[Text] The student left to this day dominates at most universities. A majority of students, who regard even communists and socialists as among the established, are turning toward a new radicalism. Varicolored [environmentalism] is in demand.

In the fall of last year the Institute for Demoscopy in Allensbach reported it in precise terms: Only one in four students was opposed to communism. The bottom line: Three out of five students polled expressed the view that communism was "sound as an idea" or even that the communist countries were superior to the capitalist ones. More than two-thirds of the million students were as red as can be: a considerable revolutionary potential.

The opinion poll appeared to confirm what had been feared by politicians of every stripe as well as by the people, intent on law and order, who had voted them into office over since the end of the public student unrest in 1968; that the colleges in the Federal Republic have turned into foundries of leftwing cadres destined to embark, well educated and well trained, on their march through the establishment.

But it did not take long for an opposite diagnosis to be announced. Like the West German conference of college presidents, Federal Minister for Education Juergen Schmude saw fit to oppose the "sensationalist news from Allensbach" (FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU), saying that a different student poll had just shown that 86 percent of the students took a positive view of parliamentary democracy.

As a matter of fact, the oppositionist atmosphere at the universities is rather weak. An academic brain trust which, as under Herbert Marcuse or Theodor Adorno in 1968, might render intellectual aid by way of a radical reform of the system is not to be found anywhere. Most professors who considered themselves promoters of the extraparlimentary opposition

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have gone into internal emigration. But this changes nothing of the basic climate. Compared with the political attitude of the population as a whole, the political spectrum at the colleges has moved to the left. The break is also visible in the participation in elections. On the average, 30 percent of students participate in electing the student parliaments--or, in Bavaria, the Student Congress. On the other hand, there are also extremes, such as all of eight valid votes--at the Ruhr Pedagogical College in Dortmund--or a turnout of 66.93 percent--at the Luebeck Medical College.

Accordingly, the majority is silent, and the young popular front rules. No wonder that not only the opposition in the Bundestag or the CDU/CSU-governed Laender see red cells in the colleges, with the universities in Bremen, Hesse and Berlin in the lead. Numerous professors, too, complain about political pressure from the left, with 21 of them submitting proof of it to the Hesse CDU, citing it as the reason why they were looking for reaching positions in a different land. From this the CDU put together a report entitled "Flight of Professors From Hesse."

There are other more momentous factors, according to the majority of college professors: a general lack of tolerance, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a bureaucracy which does not leave any time for research and teaching any longer. For example, according to Professor Hans Baier, who took over the university chair of Theodor Adorno, the Hesse college law drafted in 1970 by Ludwig von Friedsburg, formerly minister of culture, education and church affairs and now professor at the University of Frankfurt, created intolerable conditions. For this reason, he wrote, he had accepted a call to Konstanz. All there remained of Baier's attempt to renew the sociocritical Frankfurt Sociological School was resignation and flight to more peaceful pastures.

His case therefore could be regarded as confirmation of the following diagnosis by the Allensbach pollsters: The pressure of opinion from the left was so strong that the moderates, not to speak of the conservatives, no longer dared open their mouths. But precisely this today is no longer completely true. What is certain is that the political racket at the colleges since 1968 has been caused primarily by the leftists among both students and professors. And it is indisputable that the majority of the General Student Committees--student governments, as it were--are furnished by leftists of varying radicalism.

The one-time omnipotence of the leftists, however, is no longer. In 1976 an administrative federal framework college law was passed, and this law was used by the Laender for their own legislation. This led to new complaints. Since that time, professors have complained about growing administrative burdens, instructors and tutors about the curtailment of their work and research facilities, and students from left to right about the limitation of student self-government.

Bavaria and Baden-Weurttemberg, for example, used the elbowroom provided by the federal law, abolishing the classic student representation and

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replacing it with politically powerless organs. This was not an unqualified success, for, whereas the finances of the student representations can now be checked carefully by the Land government, the students have not been prevented from continuing to vote leftist.

And generally the leftists time after time get together again. Though increasingly being able to claim victories at student elections, the Christian Democratic Student Ring has not really managed to gain coalition partners. Stephan Eisel, the chairman of the organization, complains "that the Young Socialists of the SPD rather go along with the Spartakus Marxist Student League, close to the DKP, or with one of the leftist base groups than with us."

There is no getting around the fact that for the Young Socialists the class enemy is on the right. Robert Weissmantel, college secretary on the Young Socialists' federal executive, says: "The differing concepts about questions of the political mandate of student representatives and in the question of barring applicants from civil service jobs for political reasons make a coalition with the Christian students impossible."

The basic political relationships--left power, on the one hand, and right opposition, on the other--are also stable. Only in one point is there something like an ideological grand coalition. Both Christian Democratic and Young Socialist student representatives agree that it will not be possible in the foreseeable future to raise student political activity above the magic limit of 30 percent.

Both groups also take a similar view of the reason for this: political abstinence out of anger at college reality. For the study reform, invariably praised amply by all politicians, has turned into a regimentation reform. The threat of disqualification because of insufficient certificates of attendance at practical courses and an excess of semesters deters students from becoming committed. Overloaded curriculums which, with their rigid routine and thorough organization, rather resemble high school schedules accomplish the rest. In mass classes attended by several hundred participants, dialog or discussion are no longer possible.

The administratively imposed constraint to finish studies quickly has the appropriate results. Most of the students worry about the minimum of required education and about the necessary profession. A general study, such as was still typical for the scholar early in the 20th century, combined with political commitment, is sheer luxury for them. Nevertheless such regimented students will protest--but not in college, according to an analysis by the Mannheim social scientist Willi Buerklin. Buerklin points to the results of the latest Landtag elections, in which the greens and caricatured scored considerable successes, particularly in university towns. The second postwar generation, he explains, takes the material security offered by state and society for granted, while missing the realization of nonmaterial values, such as justice and humanity in politics.

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"This youth," says Buerklin, "has a very refined radical idea of democracy"--which does not meet with an echo in the established parties. Hence its attitude of protest to vote against the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP and for those who seem to correspond to its ideal.

To this extent the Allensbach student poll is confirmed indirectly: the discomfiture about institutions such as parties, government or colleges is great. Between 60 and 70 percent of the students take this view. And this is also clear from detailed analyses of election results in electoral districts with a strong student vote, with up to 70 percent of the vote going to the greens and varicolored. If this trend continues, it looks like there will be a big change over the medium term at the universities as well, but with different protagonists. The greens and varicolored, supported by the now still silent majority, would then be the alternative to the established in the student parliaments.

And among the established from this point of view is also the DKP Spartakus Student League headed by Comrade Uwe Knickrehm.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STRAUSS CAMPAIGN CONTINUES TO FLOUNDER

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Dec 79 pp 16-17

[Article: "Listless--Franz Josef Strauss in the Election Campaign"]

[Text] Actually, what he wanted was the right to set guidelines. Now it turns out that he is developing neither guidelines nor a comprehensive strategy for the CDU/CSU election campaign. Franz Josef Strauss, minister-president in faraway Munich, thinks he is sufficient unto himself.

In the Salvator Cellar in Munich, Franz Josef Strauss, a native of Munich, got down to business. The best thing, the CDU/CSU Candidate for chancellor said jokingly to friends, would be to form such a large election campaign team as to allow three governments to be tailored from it.

The audience laughed, thinking it a capital joke. Only the jokester himself probably realized that what he had done was to make a serious statement in the form of a joke. For the problem of candidate Strauss was not only the question of a possible shadow cabinet but above all the fact that he was supposed to--and wanted to--please too many.

The result is that the allegedly so strong man from Bavaria, who actually is a hesitant person, since being nominated by the CDU and CSU in the Bundestag, by and large has been content just to making a good impression. If one considers that a year hence he intends long since to have assumed office as federal chancellor, his activities and propaganda successes so far have looked rather thin.

Until the day of his nomination, he thoughts had centered solely on what his friends in the CDU liked to call his "crutch strategy"--to reconquer power with the help of a fourth party. After his nomination these plans had become superfluous. As ever, the CSU squad gathered around Strauss had its sights fixed on the scoundrels in the CDU who had not wanted Strauss to become the candidate.

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Even now the young go-getters gathered around Strauss who were out to make him chancellor did not, as one might have thought, go about developing a CDU/CSU strategy for an electoral victory in 1980 in which everyone was assigned his place and his task--Ernst Albrecht as well as Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Stoltenberg as well as Kurt Biedenkopf or Walther Leisler Kiep. Tailoring an election campaign entirely to suit the person of Strauss--who, while hardly having any chance with middle-of-the-road voters who might switch party allegiance, but allegedly appeals to skilled workers and young people (in Bavaria)--apparently made any major strategic planning unnecessary but required the candidate for chancellor to be equipped with all rights and all means of power. Consistent with this, the black guard from Bavaria claimed for its boss the "right to set guidelines."

In Konrad-Adenauer-Haus, the CDU headquarters in Bonn, they thought they had not heard right. Had not the same right to set guidelines been claimed for Helmut Kohl 4 years before by the then CDU Secretary General Kurt Fiedenkopf, causing a medium-size earthquake in the CSU? Thinking better of it, Strauss quickly dropped the plan.

In the months thereafter, however, it turned out that the CDU probably would not have suffered any particular harm if it had granted the CSU chief the right to set guidelines. Nothing was coming out of Bavaria which only remotely looked like guidelines. Instead the people in Munich continued to work out formalities, working on the frame of a picture that did not exist as yet. The next demand, made by the CSU Land organization head in Bonn, Friedrich Zimmermann, was for an election campaign coordinator.

Now, there had not been a lack of bodies before which, each and every one, was supposed to engage in coordination--the presidiums of both parties, the strategy committee composed of an equal number of CDU and CSU members, the almost standing conference of Secretaries General Heiner Geissler (CDU) and Edmund Stoiber (CSU). If there had been an additional need for an election campaign coordinator, Kurt Biedenkopf, proposed by Zimmermann, anyway was not the right person in the opinion of the CDU. The result: Another stillborn child.

Instead, however, two new bodies were created--a committee for considering election campaign strategy and a committee for drafting an election platform. The *raison d'etre* of both, above all, was to take on a "northern light"--Schleswig-Holstein Minister-President Gerhard Stoltenberg and Lower Saxon head of government, and almost candidate for chancellor, Ernst Albrecht. Another form of agreement to support him in the election campaign, Strauss was unable to wrest from these two gentlemen.

Since the election campaign team is yet to be added soon to the previous committees (its task will be, in lieu of a shadow cabinet, to put the enormous personnel reserves of the CDU/CSU in a favorable light), even well-meaning people probably will soon again arrive at a diagnosis of "committitis." Despite the strongest imaginable candidate for chancellor, Christian Democrats critical of Strauss--with amazement rather than schadenfreude--are already openly talking about weak leadership. What may be contributing to this is the candidate's absence from Bonn. The 1976 candidate for chancellor, Helmut Kohl, at that time minister-president

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in Mainz, almost spent more time in the federal capital than in the capital of his Land, thus being able to direct the apparatus of the federal CDU office in Bonn. Franz Josef Strauss, on the other hand, having no apparatus in Bonn, prefers to hold court in the Prince Carl Palace in Munich. Correspondents who want to hear what he has to say about current issues have to go to the Isar, since for months Strauss has considered it unnecessary to hold a press conference in Bonn. Since his party executive, too, is located so far away in Munich, the candidate for chancellor has asked that steps be taken to establish a liaison office in the federal capital. In a rented villa in the government district, his former personal adviser Friedrich Voss and the onetime press chief of the Munich Olympic Games Hans (Johnny) Klein--both now CSU Bundestag deputies--are to operate as their master's voice on the Rhine. As CDU concession chief, the Lower Saxon Bundestag Deputy Dr Rudolf Sprung is part of this picture, to insure that the coordination effort of the other committees is not wasted.

So far, however, the three have been unable to explain, in a way that would have an impact on the public, what Strauss really wants--except, of course, to become chancellor. Perhaps he thinks that if elected he would have the liberating effect of a German Thatcher, but there is reason for doubt here, because not even the most conservative CSU voter is apt to compare the present Schmidt-Genscher government to the last government of Callaghan, which had completely lost its hold on the destinies of Great Britain.

The issues that are more likely than others to arouse him and the citizen are often identified by Strauss, but he overestimates the spoken word. The victim of many campaigns, Strauss personally lacks all know-how when it comes to campaigns (involving issues). Without pertinent PR work, none of what he expounds in his addresses can be turned into a hit--for instance, that the citizen must be relieved of an undue tax burden, that there is need for a tax rate policy more in line with performance, that taxes not dependent on profit and thus detrimental to investment ought to be abolished, that the government quota (the share of the state in the gross national product) should be reduced from 47 percent to a maximum of 40 percent. An, albeit moderate, economic prosperity continuing to produce growth, a worrisome, though by international standards moderate, rise in the rate of inflation (6 percent), a state indebtedness of DM 420 billion in all which does not lend itself to protest as far as the layman is concerned--all these issues do not make an election campaign, least of all if the candidate for chancellor takes them up only hesitantly.

Amused and free of any responsibility, the people in the Adenauer-Haus in Bonn look on as their CSU colleagues sow the wind without reaping the whirlwind. In the CDU, for example, it has been known for years that a constant presence of the man who counts is important: the more often on television, the better. Helmut Kohl had a media adviser. Strauss rejects all cosmetics, if anything making himself uglier than he is, because he thinks that people only listen to what he has to say rather than pay attention to how good or bad he looks.

This is hardly the way for him to conquer Germany from Munich.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH ISLAM, IRAN ANALYZED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 27 Nov-2 Dec 79 pp 58-59

[Article by Helene Carrere d'Encausse]

[Text] As the czars' empire had done in the past, the USSR has always carefully controlled the dangerous zones located on its borders by defending their stability and refusing to tolerate the establishment of a single foreign influence. For a long time, Iran's situation was representative of this state of affairs. To be sure, the shah was the most reliable ally of the United States in that region but, at the same time, conscious of the Soviet pressure on a 2,500 km-long common border, he maintained cordial relations with the USSR. This patiently maintained status quo collapsed with the shah's overthrow. The USSR--as much as the United States--was confronted with the unforeseeable: the rise of Islam, a political force which disregards the traditional political game; its open hostility to the great powers; and a possible U.S. military response in the region. So far, in the face of rapidly succeeding events--from Khomeini's victory of last year to the taking of hostages in Tehran--Moscow has kept a low profile as though simple domestic Iranian problems were involved. However, should an open conflict oppose Iran to the United States, this apparent indifference could no longer be maintained. The USSR's choice would be narrow: either oppose the United States directly or abandon a Third World country to the United States when the Soviet tenet professes that the USSR systematically sides with the Third World. In the one case, the USSR would ruin a long-standing policy of privileged dialog with the United States; on the other, attacked by China and weakened by its quarrel with former allies like Egypt, its prestige would be even more affected.

The Afghan Entanglement

Faced with such a difficult choice, the Soviet Union gives all indications that, whatever the scope of the crisis developing in the Middle East, it will remain faithful to a long-standing policy consisting in not choosing and acting on two different levels. As a great power, it will endeavor to place the conflict on a political level by acting as the fierce outspoken representative--in international forums and through propaganda--of a Muslim country confronted by American counteraction.

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Two arguments justify this assumption of Soviet immobilism. Firstly, the USSR is grappling with tremendous difficulties outside its own frontiers. Owing to the revolution in Afghanistan, it was able to position itself in this buffer state at the outlying borders of the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. From Afghanistan it appeared to be in a position to pressure Iran and Pakistan through the poorly integrated Baluchi tribes on either side. Through this maneuver, it also seemed to advance toward the Gulf. The Afghan revolution and the socialist and pro-Soviet choice of its leaders justified the Soviet presence in that country. However, Islam has also emerged in Afghanistan: resistance to the Moscow-supported Afghan regime is an *Islamic* [in italic] resistance. Long perceived as an ally, the Soviet Union has now become Islam's adversary in Afghanistan.

Because succeeding events in Iran are polarizing international attention, the developing situation in Afghanistan is being forgotten. However, this oversight does not blot out the difficulties in which the USSR is enmeshed. Neither does it blot out the fresh element introduced in that region's equilibrium, namely, the USSR's military support given to the Afghan regime and its military presence in that country. So far, there has been no international response to this change in Soviet policy. It would be another matter if tomorrow Moscow were to bring its troops into Iran pleading the terms of the 1921 treaty (denounced, by the way, by the current Iranian Government).

An internal argument may be added to this motive for prudence. The USSR has a Muslim population on the border of Iran and Afghanistan which has always influenced its foreign policy, but which now takes on a new dimension through the growing number of Muslims who number almost 50 million among the Soviet population; through their youth and dynamism; and those Muslims' curiosity for the Muslim world abroad.

Since 1956, the advances achieved by the USSR in the Middle East and the Third World in general were greatly facilitated by the USSR's care to present itself to the outside world as a partially Islamic power; to assert that Islam had a place in the communist world; and to open its Islamic territory to foreign interlocutors to convince them of that fact. Such an opening certainly paid off abroad. Above all, within the USSR it developed the political confidence and national feeling of peoples of Islamic origin. It gave them the feeling of belonging as much to an overall Muslim community as to the community of the USSR's peoples. It is significant that last 5 April, in a broadcast aimed at the Turkish peoples abroad and immediately translated into Turkish, Ziya-Ud-Din, mufti of Tashkent, declared in Arabic over Radio Moscow: */"There are over 40 million Muslims in the Soviet Union."/* [in italic] This statement is a far cry from standard statements made in the USSR where authorities insist on estimating the number of Muslims at some 3 million.

For Soviet authorities, Muslims are those who practice Islam. For the Tashkent mufti, they are those who feel to be members of the Islamic community.

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Experience From the Past

This last concept is big with consequences at a time when the Muslim community is beginning to move throughout the Orient and asserting itself as a political community capable of setting up its own political order. By keeping silent over the events in Iran and not interfering, the USSR can hope to repel from its frontiers the feverish atmosphere prevailing in the neighboring Islamic countries. On the other hand, intervention in Iran would carry this fever to the Soviet territory itself and there, would develop an already strongly evident feeling of Islamic solidarity.

Consequently, if prudence compels the USSR not to act in Iran, experiences from the past suggest inversely that, in any case, it can compensate a momentary loss of prestige with an ulterior strategic gain. In 1962, following the Cuban affair which demonstrated Soviet incapability to act from far away, the Soviet state systematically undertook to acquire a fleet which now makes it into a first class naval power. Following the 1973 Israeli-Arabic War, the USSR increased its efforts to acquire a rapid and long-range transportation system for airborne troops whose efficiency was proved in Angola. If the United States' current difficulties in Iran and other Islamic countries are unfavorable to an immediate action by the USSR, it is important to remember that Soviet policy is based more on long-term action than on swift countermoves.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF'S 'L'HUMANITE' CRITICIZED FOR CZECH 'CHARTER 77' COVERAGE

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 5 Nov 79 p 84

[Article by D.D.T.: "The Czech Communist Party and its Friends"]

[Text] The wheels of Communist propaganda are coming apart, but there are still traces. Thus we read everywhere that the PCF unambiguously condemned the latest Prague proceeding. From the end of one's nose this has the air of truth. If one looks at it with his eyes, everything changes.

We are not speaking of the pre-proceeding paper in L'HUMA; there was none. Better: writers and French Communist lawyers, forbidden visas for Prague, wanted to file a motion with the Czechoslovak Embassy in Paris. At the ambassador's request they were turned away by our Capital Police, and a Parisian police commissioner told them on behalf of the Czechoslovak authorities that if they had a letter to send the Post Office was there for that purpose. How many lines in L'HUMA about it? None.

And the proceeding? In all of the press except L'HUMA we read reports of the various audiences. In L'HUMA the only audience report concerned the questioning of the people charged. In all of the press except L'HUMA we read the stories of the French witnesses arrested by the Czechoslovak police, and the picturesque details they reported. L'HUMA said nothing about it; its old readers, however, would have been interested to learn that Stalin's portrait was still in the Prague police stations. The news is not that good every day.

What was this proceeding all about? People who had formed a committee, the VONS, Committee for the Defense of Persons Unjustly Prosecuted. The creation of this committee earned them the right to be tried for subversive activities, illegal collection of funds, contacts with the Amnesty International organization, etc.

One of the accused was blamed for a package of food sent to two imprisoned signers of Charter 77. Another, of course, touched CIA money. All were accused of being part of an illegal organization; however, it had been legally registered in April 1978. What do the readers of L'HUMA know about it, what do the well-schooled Communists know about, who, as Marchais again urged them the other day,, have confidence only in the news they get from the Party press? Nothing.

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"The PCF condemned the Prague proceeding." This is false. The PCF kept silent on the actions of the accused as well as on the accusations they were understood to signify. By so doing, the PCF reduced to zero the courage they had demonstrated when they defended the prisoners. By so doing, the PCF likewise reduced to zero their good example of seizing freedom no matter what. They can be read in all directions, the Politburo statement, Salini's editorial or the anonymous commentary by L'HUMA after the verdict, not one of the names of the VONS is cited, not one of the reasons for the sentences is given. The VONS becomes "Vaclav Havel and his friends," the expression that is found in the three texts. "A trial of opinion," they write. What nerve they have! The VONS people are not in "a harsh-regime prison" for their opinions, they are in prison for their deeds. Deeds represented as subversion and treason by the Czech Communists for the use of the Czechs, deeds passed over in silence by their French Communist accomplices for the use of the French Communists. They are lying: the former by transforming into crimes actions on behalf of freedom, the latter by reducing those actions to an opinion. "They might, nevertheless, be left to think whatever they want to," the good Communist militant is supposed to tell himself, to repeat anyhow. To think what one wants, but nothing else. Especially not to think of getting together those who think otherwise. Especially not to think of mutual aid for those who think otherwise. Especially not to think of assistance for those who think otherwise and are in prison. Think freely, but all alone in your corner. The PCF will defend you. The PCF will go no farther than that.

For Salini or the Politburo not to cite the VONS, when it was the VONS that was being prosecuted, is to disapprove of creating the VONS. It is to approve its dissolution. Implicitly, by not wanting to show the proceedings against the VONS as anything other than a "trial of opinion," the Politburo, as well as Salini, as well as L'HUMA, in its commentary after the verdict, are tracing the limits of the right they are granting to "Vaclav Havel and his friends;" the right for five or six people to comment on the political situation over a cup of tea.

Imagine that "Vaclav Havel and his friends" are not in prison. Imagine that the VONS continues to exist. Imagine that it continues to recruit. Imagine that after Vaclav Havel's friends it gathers together the friends of his friends. Then comrades. Then citizens. The Committee for the Defense of Persons Unjustly Prosecuted; who would refuse to belong? Millions of Czechoslovaks demonstrating their opinion (there it is again, opinion, what a strange place to find freedom!) in the street, in business, and demanding the release of the persons unjustly prosecuted. The Soviet tanks that are leaving their barracks. The Soviet tanks that may be shooting. A year away from a French presidential election! One must put himself in Marchais' place. The "condemnation" of the Prague proceedings by the PCF, this is how he must understand it: the Czechs had to prevent the VONS from doing any damage without having a proceeding. A proceeding, I ask you. They understood nothing about socialist democracy!

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

LABOR MINISTER'S HEALTH--The minister of labor's seat may soon be vacant again. Jean Matteoli, hospitalized at Val-de-Grace since 26 November, may not return to his job, since his health requires that he take a long rest. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 21 Dec 79 p 78]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

BUDGET MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON INFLATION, LABOR

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 15 Nov 79 pp 24-25

[Interview with Italian Budget Minister Nino Andreatta by Ernesto Auci: "Please Don't Shoot at Andreatta"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The Budget minister has been accused of surrendering in the struggle against inflation. In this interview he answers criticism and proposes that the unions increase production by putting in extra hours before Christmas.

"It is true that a segment of opinion is forming that favors devaluation of the lira, but I have not drawn that card," Nino Andreatta, an economist of the Keynesian school and Budget minister, has been severely attacked in recent days for being too submissive to inflation. Salary increases given to public employees and tax reductions given to all citizens for 1980 make Andreatta, as a good Keynesian, appear to be trying to expand the economy by increasing the government budget deficit without worrying too much about the inflationary effect it will have.

"On the contrary," says Andreatta, "I think that there is now excess demand made more prominent by inelastic supply, which is why I want to ask the unions to agree immediately to work extra hours before Christmas in order to avoid market shortages."

The first to attack him was Professor Mario Monti. In an article in CORRIERE DELLA SERA he accused Andreatta of misunderstanding the true origins of inflation and not knowing how to go about fighting it. Republicans then got into the argument, along with spokesmen from the DC [Christian Democratic Party] linked with Montecitorio group leader Gerardo Bianco.

"One of the cardinal points of the government's economic policy," Andreatta explained, "is precisely the defense of the lira. Up to 1978 the exchange rate was adjusted opportunistically to consolidate reserves and strengthen the competitiveness of our markets. We paid for this with increased domestic inflation. But now reserves are high and we can adopt a policy of stabilizing the lira, which will make a positive contribution to the fight against inflation."

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[Question] But your critics say that worrying too much about not causing a recession also causes you to give up a serious fight against inflation. Massimo Riva said in LA REPUBBLICA that your policies will have the same catastrophic consequences as Ventriglia's policies in 1975, which caused the devaluation of the lira.

[Answer] Nonsense. Actually, the government does not underestimate inflation. A proof of that is the limits put on the growth in money supply. These limits will not be exceeded to finance salary and price increases beyond planned levels. In short, I have clearly stated that we will not tolerate an inflationary explosion. But as Professor Monti himself has said, we do not think a severe increase in monetary restraint is needed. A credit crunch would not be withstood by many of our businesses, and it would cause first a serious recession followed by greater inflation. On the other hand, I recently noted that the growth in money supply has been set at 16 percent for 1980 as opposed to 22 percent in the 1975-78 4-year period. This means that monetary policy will not be too restrictive if inflation stays at planned levels, but it will become "opportune" restrictive if prices go higher.

[Question] In a word, a moderately restrictive monetary policy and a slightly expansive budgetary policy. But is it certain that this push-pull policy will succeed when it is clear that such a double dosage is very difficult?

[Answer] In a slowdown phase of the world economy we cannot set overly ambitious objectives concerning the growth rate. All we can do is try to limit the negative impact from abroad. And that is what we have done.

[Question] But many think that the little that has been done is already too much in a situation that is difficult for all Western economies. Thus, to derive a negligible advantage in income growth, inflationary aspects are being ignored when they will cause critical harm. Are these fears well founded?

[Answer] I think the government has moved very cautiously in making provisions to sustain demand. But aid to investment is based on an improvement plan and on the use of funds already appropriated rather than being based on the law of industrial restructuring. All this has been done out of a conviction that greater stability in the income growth rate will be good for investment. In fact, businessmen plan their investment on the basis of medium-term considerations. Thus, sharp depressions and speedy recoveries just make the future more uncertain and contribute to delay in making investment decisions. In this context we have offered the unions all we could, as we also did to business. But now we say "enough." We mean an end to wage increases and tax reductions, and an end to attempts to attack the lira.

[Question] But in so doing you have given an impression of weakness and encouraged the unions to ask for more. If their new package is accepted, between taxes and pension increases it would cost the country 8 trillion lire. Wasn't it appropriate to discuss with the unions even the concessions made without any attempt at resistance?

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[Answer] I feel we had a serious discussion. We looked at treasury receipts and evaluated the economic situation. We thought it was a good time to support family spending a little as well as business competitiveness. Now we are telling both the unions and parliament that public spending cannot grow any more. Thus we have to raise taxes to bring the deficit down from 42 to 40 trillion lire.

[Question] But if the deputies increase public spending and the unions ask for big wage increases, inflation will get out of control, and, as you said recently, the economy will go to the "gallows of the central bank." Is that right?

[Answer] I have already said that the money supply will not grow more than planned. If inflation is greater, it will cause a credit crunch that will, as usual, strangle the economy, especially the healthiest part of it: the people who invest and produce for the marketplace. In that sense I used the expression "gallows of the central bank" to emphasize that monetary policy is killing the patient.

[Question] All this concerns the short term. But many people maintain that the problems are actually due to old imbalances and can be cured only by radically changing these imbalances. What is being done, then, to provide energy for the next ten years or to increase productivity?

[Answer] I really think the historic task of this government is to get out of the absurd energy situation we are in. Nobody wants electric power plants be they nuclear or traditional. Nor do communities want electric power lines going through their land. Do people know that the South may remain in darkness because of the present shortage of power lines? Thus the primary problem is energy. The second one, which I have mentioned several times, is that of implementing an industrial policy that would avoid tensions created by demand due primarily to short supplies and that show up a few months after an economic upturn and fuel inflation. We must increase productivity, cut losing sectors and concentrate our efforts in those that have growth possibilities.

[Question] In conclusion, would you say we are in for a crisis of long duration?

[Answer] Aside from short-term oscillations, I have no doubt that we are in for a difficult decade. Energy problems and all the economic consequences they entail will bring about a complete reorganization of the entire productive system. This reorganization can be accomplished only over the long term. In the meantime we cannot rule out crises, even serious ones.

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But Pandolfi Is an Emperor Without Clothes

Many economists think the government is not serious about fighting inflation. But even if a minister is convinced that inflation is a real catastrophe, he must then make a dramatic confession of his inability to wage war against rising prices. That is the case of the Treasury minister, Pandolfi, who has been forced to admit in various interviews that the only tool the government has is monetary policy.

Yet it is true that by clearly stating that if parliament, industrialists, and the unions do not behave consistently the government will tighten credit and cause a recession, this is in itself a step forward compared to the recent past. But will it be enough? Exhortations to be "virtuous" have hitherto fallen on deaf ears, but are they likely to be heeded now that the government is brandishing not only the carrot of growth but also the stick of strict monetary policy?

As it is, these government announcements have been greeted with scepticism because the ministers themselves have not been acting consistently. Why should businessmen resist the unions if the government jumps at the first bark? How is it possible to cooperate in stabilizing the lira through greater business efficiency if, for starters, the minister of Government Participation makes a present of 4.5 trillion lire to public corporations with no guarantee that they will be made more efficient?

More examples could be given. But there is only one conclusion: while the government has taken a few steps forward, it is still slow in demonstrating that it really intends to beat inflation.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

EDITORIAL SCORES KHOMEYNI'S ACTIONS, DENOUNCES TERRORISM

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 2 Dec 79 p 3

[Editorial by Juan Tomas de Salas: "Acts of Ayatollahs"]

[Text] The big difference between Ayatollah Khomeyni, abductor of embassies, and the Ayatollahs Bandres and Onaindia, "friends" of abductors of deputies [a reference to the Ruperez kidnapping by ETA-PM (Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group-Political and Military)] is that the inspired Iranian holy man kidnaps directly and the others kidnap by proxy, without revealing themselves. We do not know which of the two systems is worse, but the fact is that both are part of the trend of irrationality and new barbarism which is currently threatening to lead mankind to new and dreadful holocausts. It may be claimed that we humans cannot live without killing, and that, every 30 or 40 years, the mechanism of horror and the trip to the inferno without Dante, and with Creonte, start automatically.

The action taken by Ayatollah Khomeyni against the American Embassy has little precedent in peacetime, among large countries and in this century. Since international law was invented, to attack the embassy of another country has been an act of war, appearing in all the manuals. Then, to subject all the diplomats of the white race wearing trousers to trial for espionage is an act in violation of all the principles of international peaceful coexistence. Knowing the efficiency of the Islamic courts in shooting homosexuals, or stoning adulterers to death, one can understand even more clearly the concern among the civilized public over the contemptible acts of that holy man with an infernal beard, who must have one of the most spiteful souls in the world.

We are being threatened with a traditional war. To the amazement of the West, which had established itself on the dread of an atomic apocalypse and nothing more, an old-fashioned, traditional war could break out any day. The emperor Carter, the man who wanted to complete his 4 years in office without having any American killed in a war, is learning first-hand that one cannot be good and an emperor at the same time. The madmen will eat him, or the rats will spit at him.

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After nearly 3 decades of exercising an all-embracing power on three quarters of the globe, the Athens of the 20th century had reaped many grudges and enemies; and now, apparently, it is time to pay for the sins of old, one by one. Three years of yielding to the orders of a farmer saint sufficed for the Eastern empire to grab a couple of continents for him by force, and for the madness of a holy man to bring the United States to its knees. The "via crucis" [way of the cross] of peaceful empires could be a shocking martyrdom.

And what can we small, castrated Europeans do? Of one thing there is no doubt: The United States is the Athens of the 20th century, and it is there that the culture and liberty of man have reached the highest levels in history. When it attacks and polices the world, we dwarfs feel deeply angry at the powerful one. But when a fearful holy man threatens to spread his irrationality through the Arab world, when an epidemic of mediaevalism spreads in part of the globe, or when a totalitarian Brazhnevian bureaucracy puts rocks in Africa and missiles in Poland, we small dwarfs of the West discover that, after all, Athens is worth a million times more than the holy man or the Politbureau.

And, in Spain, Ruperez is still in chains. He has had 2 weeks of horror in the hands of a few violent mountebanks, who conceal their faces and hands while they ruthlessly attack the liberty and integrity of mankind. That, indeed, is torture, Mr Bandres. One senses that you could save Deputy Javier Ruperez, and it would suffice to read clippings from newspapers of the past 3 years to realize that this is so. The party in which you are a militant, as an "independent," and which you represent in Parliament, was created by the ETA-Political and Military, and forms a politicomilitary front with it. These are facts, not words, and your Ku-Klux-Klan jokes are of no use in dispelling the certainty that you could free Ruperez. It would be dangerous for you, Mr Bandres, but you could do it.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

'CAMBIO' LOOKS AT EFFECTS ON SPAIN FROM IRANIAN CRISIS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 2 Dec 79 pp 59-61, 63

[Special report: "The Wrath of Allah Reaches Here"]

[Excerpts] There will be no problems of supply or restrictions for automobile drivers if the tension does not become dangerously exacerbated. But, for the 7.3 billion liters that they will consume during 1980, they may be paying as much as 80 pesetas per liter by the end of the year. And, while Iran cuts off its supply, Kuwait is reducing its from 2.2 to 1.5 million barrels per day. Libya is curbing its sales by 30 percent, followed by Iraq and Nigeria. As they have threatened, there will be no energy at any price.

At 0100 hours on the morning of Thursday, 15 November, the economic vice-president, Fernando Abril Martorell, held one of the most tense meetings in recent years. A few minutes earlier, Carlos Bustelo, minister of industry, and Luis Magana, "Mr Energy," had moved from their official offices to 3 Castellana, in downtown Madrid. Jose Luis Leal, minister of economy, and his entire staff, were present. But the real protagonists of the meeting were thousands of kilometers away: more specifically, in Washington and Teheran.

Two days earlier, on Tuesday, 13 November, Spaniards could read in the newspapers that Carter had cut his oil imports from Iran; and, on the other hand, Khomeini claimed that it was Iran that had turned off the tap.

The following day, Abril Martorell, with some extra circles under his eyes, remarked: "We are entering an emergency area." Shortly thereafter, the economic vice-president went to Moncloa, summoned by a Suarez with a two-fold concern: Ruperez and Iran. CAMBIO 16 was told by Javier del Moral, undersecretary of economy and the government's spokesman on economic affairs: "It is the economic problem which most concerns the government."

On subsequent days, the contacts, meetings and studies intensified. There were official and semi-official calls to the American Embassy, and to the Spanish Embassies in Washington and Teheran, as well as to the diplomatic

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representatives of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Madrid: Objective: to insure the supply at any cost. Is it serious? "This could be the prelude to World War III," CAMBIO 16 was told sternly by a high-ranking official in the administration.

Whether or not the United States intervenes militarily in the Persian Gulf, at the risk of an international armed conflict, we are already at war. What the United States terms the "energy Pearl Harbor" has placed all the industrialized countries on the consumer front, in this great daily battle against the countries which have crude oil. And Spain will be in a worse position than other countries when it is time for the big battle. Abril Martorell has admitted: "We are dreadfully vulnerable." With hardly any petroleum or natural gas to take to the refineries, we are in the hands of any all-powerful Khomeini.

Energy Alert

Juan Temboury, head of the Center of Energy Studies, states flatly: "Spain is the most vulnerable country in the West." Hence, all the countries are in a state of "energy alert" (there was a meeting last weekend in Paris of the OCDE [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and an urgent convocation issued by the International Energy Agency for a meeting within a few days), with Spain on edge.

Roberto Centeno, counselor-delegate of CAMPSA [Leasing Company of the Petroleum Monopoly, Inc], told CAMBIO 16: "If no new catastrophe occurs, there will be no oil shortage in Spain during 1980; but the oil supply is far from certain over the medium term."

Luis Magana, the energy commissioner, has also assured this magazine that the current supplies are guaranteed, because a policy of diversifying supplies, and increasing the government-to-government purchase contracts, which are always safer, is being pursued." Javier del Moral remarks: "But we are in a fiendishly complicated situation. Today, no one can make predictions for even 6 months hence, except to say that the situation as a whole will be worse."

The Bill, Nearly Double

Roberto Centeno, at CAMPSA, agrees about the bills, noting that, in 1980, between \$10.5 and \$11.5 billion will have to be paid for crude, "76 percent more than this year."

With an average hike of only 50 percent, over 200 billion extra pesetas will have to be paid for gasoline in 1980. Based on the other hypotheses, there would be an extra oil bill in excess of 300 billion pesetas.

Javier del Moral tells this magazine, with deep concern: "This is an enormous amount for the economy." Although it depends on how the world economy

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reacts, the government's economic spokesman assured CAMBIO 16 that it entails a growth of 1.5 percent less (an optimistic hypothesis) or 2.5 percent less (a not overly pessimistic hypothesis). In unemployment figures, this means ending the year 1980 with between 200,000 and 300,000 more unemployed, due to the effect of energy prices alone. And then we would have 1.5 million officially unemployed.

Wages Frozen

Javier del Moral adds: "We are heading toward zero growth in all the industrialized countries, and the Spanish economy might grow 1 percent; because we are currently growing at a rate below the OCDE average."

If we have to pay between 200 and 300 billion more pesetas on account of the Khomeinis and merchants swarming all over the world, it will have to come from somewhere. Javier del Moral explains categorically: "It can only come out of the pockets of all Spaniards." This means between 6,000 and 8,000 more pesetas per capita that will have to be paid per year. It is as if those who have oil had frozen the wages of all Spaniards in 1980.

During 1980, it is definite that the prices of all energy products: gasoline, gas oil for heating, fuel oil and electricity, will increase. And, as a result, so will everything else, because the costs of business firms and of everything we consume will rise.

According to Roberto Centeno, the counselor-delegate of CAMPSA, "For every 10 percent overall rise in the price of crude, the price index increases 1 percent, 0.25 percent directly and 0.75 percent indirectly, if the prices of the other energy products rise as well, and wages increase simultaneously to preserve purchasing power. One way of reducing the inflationary effect is to remove energy prices from the cost of living index."

In this regard, the government is studying a new price index which would not include the energy inflation for wage changes. This would mean that the 7 percent price hike for energy products would come directly out of everyone's pocket, and there would be no compensation. In other words, we would become 7 percent poorer.

Gasoline Is Taking Off

To many Spaniards, the most visible aspect of this oil bill will be the increased price of gasoline. According to information obtained by CAMBIO 16, the price of the precious fluid may increase at the beginning of January. How much? Roberto Centeno comments: "It is my opinion that gasoline prices should rise to the same extent as those of oil." Considering the fact that the repercussion from oil on gasoline amounts to 18 pesetas per liter, if the taxes do not increase, the price of "high-test" would be about 55 pesetas per liter.

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But the energy crisis does not consist merely of the fact that we shall have to pay 80 pesetas for gasoline, a price officially regarded as likely, or that the price of a kilowatt will go sky high. What most concerns the experts is that the time may come when there is no gasoline or electricity even at 1,000 pesetas a liter or kilowatt. No one can imagine a world without energy, but no one can guarantee oil supplies for several years.

At the moment, the Kuwait authorities have mentioned the possibility of cutting production from 2.2 million barrels per day to 1.5 million. According to a restricted report in the International Energy Agency, there is uncertainty about the supplies from Iran, Iraq, Libya and Nigeria.

Only Saudi Arabia, the "scab country" in OPEC, is producing 1 million barrels more, although recent political events on that peninsula are not at all reassuring. On the whole, according to evidence from Algeria, the OPEC production may decline from 30 to 27 million barrels per day.

This means that, in 1980, there may be 3 million fewer barrels per day on the market, which is three times what Spain consumes. And this crude cannot be improvised: someone will have to consume less. So, Spain and the other countries are faced with the dilemma of either consuming less or rationing.

Saving Is Called For

The saving of energy, therefore, appears to be the most important energy source for the future. Last summer, the industrialized countries reached an agreement in Tokyo to cut their energy consumption by 5 percent; and there is every indication (according to Luis Magana) that, at the next meeting of the International Energy Agency, political commitments will be made to reduce demand.

Spain is in a worse position than other countries, because it lags behind the consumption. It is more difficult to cut consumption when one uses little than when one uses a great deal. But the government is bent upon achieving this at any cost, provided no restrictions ever occur, and so that energy will not waste the nation's growth. "Let whoever uses save" seems to be the slogan, and hence the efforts are concentrated on industry and transportation, which absorb three quarters of the energy that we consume.

With regard to industry, an energy conservation bill has just reached the Cortes, and an attempt is being made to have it passed through the emergency procedure.

Moreover, the Ministry of Industry and Energy is hastening the construction of thermal powerplants using native coal (10 within the next 3 years) and imported coal (two); as well as concluding an agreement with the cement

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companies for saving 1.7 million of the 2.5 million tons that they consume, in 2 years, and for replacing them with coal.

In the case of gas oil for heating, the planned limitation calling for the delivery this winter of 20 percent less than last winter is being carried out.

There are no prominent short-term measures governing gasoline. Recently, an agreement was reached by gasoline station owners that 70 percent would close at night, and 35 percent on weekends. And, if the situation should become worse, ration cards are being prepared, but are not expected to be ready until January.

At present, there is no closing of gasoline stations on weekends, although this would go into effect if there is more curtailment of production.

Juan Temboury told CAMBIO 16: "Sometimes it is maddening to think that we are spending 40 billion pesetas to save 7 percent of our industrial consumption in 2 years, and then, in a few hours, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries decides on increases of between 10 and 15 percent." He added: "But, we must do what we can, because if not, the country would have to come to a standstill."

At the moment, the government is concerned with giving a maximum impetus to the National Energy Plan, which had come into conflict with financing problems. Javier del Moral remarks: "We must offer more opportunities and resources for financing, both internal and external, even if they have to be taken from somewhere else, if we do not want to bring the country to a standstill."

To keep the country running, we are setting forth on a new energy crusade. Luis Magana concludes by saying: "The oil situation is bad, and will become worse in the future. The country will have to make a tremendous economic effort to emerge from this crisis, and it will require sacrifice of the entire society."

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The Users of Energy

Industry:

Chemical	10.59
Iron and steel	7.03
Cement	4.88
Metallurgy	3.42
Other industries	23.99

Total:	49.91
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Transportation:

Automobiles	10.70
Other transportation	12.80

Total:	23.50
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Household use:

Heating	7.00
Lighting and electrical appliances	3.40

Total:	10.40
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Miscellaneous:


Agriculture	3.83
Fishing	1.29
Trade and services	4.12
Construction and public works	1.53
Losses and commissions	3.75
Other uses	1.64

Total:	16.16
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Source: Ministry of Industry and Energy (1978)

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Chart 1.




Key:

1. Where the oil comes from
2. January-September 1979
3. United Kingdom, 0.26 percent
4. National product, 18.4 percent
5. Algeria, 1.96 percent
6. Congo, Egypt, Cameroon, Nigeria, Abu Dhabi, Gabon, 1.49 percent
7. Libya, 9.42 percent
8. Iraq, 12.67 percent
9. Saudi Arabia, 35.17 percent

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Chart 2.




Key:

1. Spain, lagging behind consumption
2. Coal
3. Oil
4. Natural gas
5. Electricity
6. Tons of oil per capita
7. Sweden
8. Belgium-Luxembourg
9. Netherlands
10. Federal Republic of Germany
11. Switzerland
12. United Kingdom
13. France
14. Italy
15. Spain

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Chart 3.



Key:

1. Savings, the energy of the future
2. Equivalent millions of barrels of oil per day
3. Demand without savings
4. Energy savings
5. Demand with savings planned
6. Other
7. Nuclear
8. Coal
9. Gas
10. Oil
11. Excluding the USSR, Eastern Europe and China

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

SOCIALIST UGT BEGINS TO DISASSOCIATE FROM COMMUNIST CCOO

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 2 Dec 79 pp 22-24

[Text] Employers and centrists are trying to push the PCE into the "ghetto" of its parliamentary and electoral dimensions: 10 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, the Socialists are waiting with mysterious satisfaction, and the political mapmakers are already drawing up a new map for the country: an imperfect two-party system.

On 25 October 1977, a 44-page document with 11 signatures on its last page was to become the star political "celebrity" of the fall and of the entire following year. It was the document promoted by Fuentes Quintana and endorsed by the leaders of all the parties represented in Parliament, and its purpose was to pull the country out of its economic crisis in an unusual example of political boldness. It was the Moncloa Pacts.

And the results of the general elections of 15 June 1977 were still fresh from Martin Villa's computer. Later there would come the long and painful constitutional process, consensus--the other "star" of those months--the terrorist outbreaks, and the common fear of deterioration. Emerging from the pacts were the flirtation between Suarez and Carrillo, the "engagement" between the government and the CCOO [Workers Commissions], the birth of the employers' organization known as the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Employers Organizations], and its support for the backers of Fraga's Popular Alliance [AP].

It was a time which was totally provisional in nature and in which the proximity of a number of second general elections determined tactics and produced tensions among the three ideological components of the government party, the UCD [Democratic Center Union].

But the events of only 2 years ago are now considered almost prehistoric, chiefly when viewed against the panorama now before the political analyst's eyes.

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The March 1979 elections meant the consolidation of the parties represented in Parliament. Basically, and with the exception of the disaster that hit the Democratic Coalition, they retained the same relative percentages as in June 1977.

Ferrer's Move

And the absence of elections--barring the unexpected--over the next 4 years creates the conditions for a new situation that is already beginning to take shape in the minds of the political mapmakers. It is the new Spanish political map with its hues of an imperfect two-party system in which the Popular Alliance is being weakened into the insignificance of its testimonial presence and the Communist Party finds itself harassed by centrists and Socialists, who are disposed to reduce it to its true dimensions--that is, to those corresponding to 10 percent of the vote.

And in the new strategy, the CEOE's posture is basic. In his speech last 12 December at Century 21, the chairman of the CEOE, Carlos Ferrer Salat, first boasted of his organization's deep democratic conviction--an assertion more in accord with the theses of the UCD than with those of the CD [expansion unknown], which so far, and theoretically, has been supported by the employers--and then hinted at the impossibility of establishing privileged relations with the Workers Commissions, since in the long run such relations would benefit the Communist Party.

That is perhaps the first attitude suggesting political change by one of the social forces--the employers--to emerge from Spain's still-young democracy. Once again, Marx was right, and social pressure was turning into the spearhead of political changes.

Ferrer's attitude was to be verified by CAMBIO 16: a high source in the employers' organization said, "We cannot continue to rely on the CCOO, even though they are the most serious negotiators." And in turn, it would seem to be producing a curious deviation: support by the employers for the political forces grouped in the AP and a clear association with centrist policy.

In this respect, attention should be drawn to Ferrer Salat's significant meetings with Suarez and Abril Martorell and to the meetings by the economic deputy chairman with a large group of bankers before the presentation of the PEG (Government Economic Plan) to Congress, a meeting that was to provoke sharp criticism from the left, chiefly among the Communists. Shortly before, the CEOE had sent the government a "memorandum" in which it established its position on the economic crisis, labor relations, and the income policy. That position was to have its effect when the time came to draw up the Government Economic Plan.

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Turnabout by UGT

Last 10 July the Spanish union world was severely shaken when the basic inter-confederation agreement was signed between the UGT [General Union of Workers] and the CEOE. The Workers Commissions were not represented and later rejected that agreement. The agreement between the socialist central union and the employers' organization was the first move in a series of UGT actions that were to shift that union's direction by 180 degrees and give it the initiative in union matters over its rival, the larger CCOO.

In the agreement, the UGT set the standard for a new style in this country's labor relations that contrasted sharply with the line followed in previous periods. It thus passed from an intransigent leftist stance using the strike as a constant element in negotiation to one in which the dominant elements were a climate and spirit of negotiation, calmness, and an image of good sense before the workers.

The UGT thus initiated as well the break in that unity of union action in which, being hitched to the wagon of the CCOO, it was always likely to lose because of being outdone during confrontations by the greater activity and initiative of the Communist central union, which thus prevented it from developing its own theses.

This attitude by the Socialist union gave the CCOO a free hand to present itself to the workers as the hardened union of mobilizations. At the same time, it isolated the Communists with their proposal for four-sided negotiations that would include participation by the employers, the unions, the government, and the political parties.

After that proposal, no observer could fail to see the real political intent of the move: it was to force the government and the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] to accept the PCE in the negotiations under conditions of equality, with the corresponding expectations of confrontation and political capital that the system provided.

The UGT's new attitude establishes a new framework of relations with the government and the UCD. For example, Nicolas Redondo met with Suarez (who during his trip to Brazil promised to begin restoring the UGT to its historical patrimony), while Marcelino Camacho has been waiting for over a month to be received by the president of government.

For its part, the centrist party is abandoning for good the idea of setting up a third non-Marxist union based on the USO [Workers Trade Union], an organization which would seriously impair the UGT's strength and which supports Socialist theses in the debate on the Workers Statute. In that debate, the Socialists favor giving power to the union sections, as opposed to the Communist choice of giving power to the enterprise committees.

The words and attitude of Marcelino Camacho, leader of the CCOO, within the Labor Committee can also be seen as significant: "Everything is agreed on

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between the UCD and the PSOE for implementing the agreements between the CEOE and the UGT. The intention is to empty the enterprise committees of their content."

The UGT's break with unity in union action following the agreement with the CEOE has upset the Communist union's entire strategy. In the opinion of the most impartial observers, the Communist union has since then committed numerous errors. Following the CEOE-UGT pact, for example, the CCOO, which until then had followed a line of negotiation and moderation--it was the union most favorable to the Moncloa Pacts--has shown a total change in attitude and is threatening mobilizations and strikes, as reflected in Camacho's suggested order to go out on a general strike.

CCOO Embarrassment

The risks involved in the operation are forcing the CCOO's leaders to back-track hurriedly. Even Santiago Carrillo, secretary general of the PCE, expressed in an interview his complete opposition to the calling of a general strike. The CCOO had to settle for a rally in Madrid on 14 October at which there were echoes of vertical unionism and which, in the opinion of minority groups within the CCOO--the LCR [Revolutionary Communist League], the MC [expansion unknown], and others--amounted to the "death certificate of the general strike."

There have been other failures besides the general strike. Examples are the strike at gasoline stations in August and the strike at RENFE [Spanish National Railroads] in October, both of which met with little response. This situation has managed to create strong tensions within the CCOO Confederal Secretariat, with strong differences between members of the ruling body. Nicolas Sartorius is considered to support theses very different from those upheld by Camacho.

In this situation, the CCOO has begun a policy of discrediting the Workers Statute, which is now being debated by the Labor Committee in Congress. The confrontations have been so severe that on one occasion the committee chairman ruled Camacho out of order for making offensive personal remarks to the UCD spokesman (whom he reminded of the latter's verticalist past).

That attitude is explained by the fact that the PCE presented its own plan and by a desire by the CCOO to assert their union hegemony.

PCE and PSOE Behind it

Behind the agitated world of union confrontation are the parties that direct the two big central unions, the PCE and the PSOE.

The PSOE special congress put an end to all internal dissensions, and the party came out of it with a stronger image of intending once again to set itself up as an alternative for power.

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According to all the Socialist leaders, the internal debate during the 4-month interval has cleared up the party's internal panorama. Following from that is the PSOE's intention to draw up an autonomous political program in the center but, above all, without contact with the PCE.

In that program, the political rift between the two big parties on the left corresponds to the union rift between the CCOO and the UGT. The PSOE has thus decided to waste no time in replacing the skirmishes of interparty struggle with more serious action--genuine "state action."

That analysis entails a Socialist refusal to extend the municipal pacts with the PCE to other areas such as Parliament or the unions. Jeronimo Saavedra, leader of the UGT and a PSOE member of Parliament from the Canary Islands, points out: "The Communist Party wants to substitute unity of the left for its plan to have everyone, from the right to the left, sit down at the same table. But the attempt is stillborn. The PSOE has its own autonomous plan, and the strategies are different." For his part, Joaquin Almunia, member of the Executive Board, told this magazine that "unity of the left would blur the Socialist proposal and serve to increase the power of the PCE, which is not resigned to the minority role it has as a result of its 23 deputies."

According to Almunia, the PSOE now has a new frontier. "It must find its role as the opposition, taking into account the fact that, for one thing, the process of constitutional development is continuing and that, for another, it is proposing its alternatives for change as a leftist party."

But the policy of the Socialist leaders is to maintain very good relations with their Communist comrades even though the agreements are not being extended, and they criticize the UCD's intention to isolate the PCE as being an "error." That is what this magazine was told by a member of the Socialist Executive Board.

It may be that behind that stand is the Socialist intention to use its municipal pacts and its ideological good neighbor policy with the PCE as a tool with which to harass and pressure the centrist government.

To this would have to be added moderate stands in legislative action, an example being the nonpresentation of alternate drafts for every government bill, in exchange for which the UCD is to allow the approval of Socialist amendments.

For its part, the PCE still does not have a very clear strategy following the abrupt changes in the situation. The Communist theses are becoming steadily less viable--an integrated government in political matters, a four-sided pact in social matters, and a plan of national solidarity in economic matters--and the fear of isolation is beginning to show up in statements by Communist leaders.

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For example, Santiago Carrillo stated before the Central Committee this past 11 November that "there are those who ardently desire to isolate the PCE in the opposition."

For his part, Marcelino Camacho was to tell CAMBIO 16: "One is isolated when one is a minority, but we are the majority in the factories. As far as the PCE is concerned, there have always been attempts to isolate it."

For his part, Enrique Curiel, secretary of the Communist Parliamentary Group, adds another interpretation: "The UCD has an interest in accentuating the political and union differences in order to create the conditions for breaking off the municipal pacts."

And what is the strategy to be pursued in such a situation? Information gathered by this weekly indicates that the PCE will capitalize on that isolation. Carrillo has already said it: "We are not afraid to carry the burden of opposition politics in Parliament and in the country."

For his part, he would make the attempt to offset the PCE's weakness with pressure from the CCOO, a pressure that reaches even into Parliament, where positions being taken in connection with the Workers Statute almost favor an assembly approach. An attempt is also being made to increase the scope of the left's municipal agreements, which the Socialists are refusing to take beyond their current limits of simple "good neighborliness."

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

PSOE'S POSITION ON NAVARRE, BASQUE ISSUE SEEN AS AMBIGUOUS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 9 Dec 79 p 29

[Article by Jose Miguel de Azaola: "The PSOE and Navarre"]

[Text] One of the main and most critical problems discussed at the recent congress of the Basque PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] was the incorporation of Navarre into the autonomous community which the Basques are about to establish.

The vast majority of the Basque Socialists are in favor of this incorporation, whereas those from Navarre are greatly divided on the issue. Unable to impose their own theses without causing a split in the Navarre PSOE, the Basques have accepted one which, in turn, is a compromise between two opposing trends among the Navarre Socialists: the one favoring and the one against the incorporation. This compromise coincides with the aspirations of those within the Navarre PSOE itself who want a gradual, partial association with the Basques' community and, at the same time, reject complete integration which (in their opinion) would be detrimental to the interests of Navarre and to the maintenance of their own institutional features.

To summarize, the Basque PSOE has decided to postpone (to an undetermined future, which could be equally distant or very distant) the proposal for the incorporation to the Navarran electoral body, and to opt resolutely for the course of action afforded by Section 2 of Article 22 of the Basque Statute, whereby "the autonomous community may conclude agreements with another statutory historical territory (the reference to Navarre could not be clearer) for the management and rendering of individual services relating to the areas within its jurisdiction."

I do not consider it possible at present to predict the results of the implementation of that text, which will depend on the more or less favorable view of the respective governors (both those of Navarre and those of the community). It could give rise to a feeble, limited cooperation, and a close collaboration in many important areas (without detriment to the complete reciprocal independence of the two sides, or else increasing their

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mutual dependence); and it could also fall into disuse, and become shelved. I dare to predict that, strangely enough, the greater the scope and efficacy of its implementation, the less eager the Navarrans (and perhaps the Basques, as well) will be to attain an incorporation which, in addition to being troublesome, would then appear superfluous to many.

Viewing the matter from an objective, dispassionate standpoint, we find that both the aggressive resurgence of Basque nationalism and the proclivity of many sectors thereof for radical, subversive positions have proven highly detrimental to the political unity of the Basque Country. In the eyes of a Basque nationalism that is consistent with itself, the incorporation of Navarre is the conclusion that one unavoidably reaches from an emotional, mystical and myth-making apriorism (such as that of any kind of nationalism, regardless of its label): the political unity of the nation cannot be brought into question. This position could not help but clash directly with those of many Navarrans who, feeling profoundly and irrevocably Spanish, discover in that incorporation advocated by the nationalists of a contrary bent an attempt, which they deem unacceptable, to make Navarre Basque and deprive it of its Spanish nature (because, based on the internal logic of the Basque nationalists, what is Basque is not Spanish, and what is Spanish is not Basque). Furthermore, and since (contrary to what has occurred among the Basques) the Basque nationalist movement in Navarre has not, as a majority, assumed the centrist and conservative positions of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party], but rather the extremist ones of other radical and subversive forces, there has occurred among the center and right wing Navarran voters, as well as among those of the moderate left, a very forceful rejection of the Basque nationalist demands (preeminent among which is incorporation into the community of the fellow provinces); a rejection which is far less extensive among the sectors related to the Basque electoral body.

These circumstances place the PSOE in an extremely difficult situation (it might almost be fitting to say that it has been caught in a trap), that of the team forced to play the decisive match in the opposing team's field; because it is faced with a matter the proposal of which is not its doing, but is, rather, based on emotional apriorisms that are completely alien to its basic concerns and aspirations, or in overt contradiction to them. To its misfortune (and that of all those who view the issue in terms of political rationality), this matter is ceasing to be an issue on which there can be conversation, negotiation or discussion; and has become a symbol of contradiction concerning which one can only battle. Hence the desire to avoid a referendum (a sensible, decisive procedure, acceptable in any society that is governed by rational standards) which, in present-day Navarre, is threatening to be a violent clash, capable of destroying the coherence of the old realm and of precluding civic coexistence within it for a long time. The fear of this danger is shared by the PSOE and several other political forces, including large sectors of the PNV.

The lengthy statements made by Deputy Urralburu to the newspaper DEIA (published on 11 November), in which this Navarran Socialist leader talks

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about the "sector of the Navarran people which does not have a Basque destiny," and the "sector which needs a bond with the Basque Country," reveal the deepseated division which has made expressing the problem in rational terms so difficult today and, furthermore, has almost prevented considering it as a problem, making it an irrational dilemma: an instinctive option between two emotional apriorisms.

In the view of some, the incorporation of Navarre is a demand "of the left," and, conversely, an aspiration "of the right." Such an assessment (which is not completely erroneous, but still highly inaccurate) reflects a current phenomenon.

The fact is that, under the Franco regime, Navarre's statutory individuality was consolidated quite appreciably, and the conservative classes (which are traditionally dominant in Navarre) benefited from this. But the Navarran left (which was not at all Basque in the past) has in turn been able to make use, at present and in the future, of the most autonomous regime that exists in Spain (and will exist for a long time to come). Now then, for this purpose, it will have to unite. In doing so, it can only continue to lead a sterile and sterilizing agitation, both if Navarre pursues its own course or if it becomes incorporated into an autonomous community wherein the center and the right could, without too much effort, set the guidelines in an imperative fashion.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

HENRI LEVY CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE PCE'S CARRILLO

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 2 Dec 79 pp 109-111

[Interview with Bernard-Henri Levy by Fernando Arrabal; date and place not given]

[Text] Bernard-Henri Levy does not give up. Shortly after his violent TV debate with Santiago Carrillo, he told Fernando Arrabal in an interview with CAMBIO 16: "I challenge the secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) to a theoretical debate on Marxism whenever and wherever he wants." The following is a summary of the interview.

Arrabal: After 40 years of hated fascism, the Spanish intellectual world is looking at a variety of Marxism that has been accorded a privileged status because of its opposition to the previous regime. In spite of my hopes for Spain's young democracy, I think that I see the same spiritual impoverishment as yesterday. What impression did you get from the arguments of the Spanish Marxists on TVE [Spanish Television]?

Bernard-Henri Levy: What arguments are you talking about? Tierno Galvan was there, the mayor of Madrid, an old academician and professor who spoke to viewers like a missionary of yesteryear would speak to an underdeveloped tribe. This Socialist leader, who was clearly terrorized by Carrillo's blackmail, was discussing Marxism, its martyrs and its tragedies as if in a friendly and innocuous drawing room conversation. And Carrillo himself, whose awesome, incredible theoretical ignorance all of Spain was able to verify, was barely able, the poor fellow, to tell the difference between "superstructure" and "infrastructure" or to correctly quote the highly classic "grundrisse" (by Marx). What most shocked me was the strange forwardness of these antiquated, well-fed, secure politicians, who were amiably speculating, as if it were nothing, about the millions of deaths in contemporary charnel houses. And at the same

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time there was the comic indigence of their analysis, the deep-seated illiteracy of these people who pass for learned and wise individuals. Allow me to issue, through CAMBIO 16, a challenge to the secretary general of the PCE to a theoretical debate on Marxism whenever and wherever he wants, books in hand and basing ourselves on the texts. I will show that that man is not only a liar and a police agent but also that he does not know what he is talking about.

Arrabal: You have written that "the totalitarian revolution is an unprecedented disaster." What role does Eurocommunism play in this disaster?

Levy: I told Carrillo in our TV debate: Eurocommunism is nothing more than the European voice of Stalinism. Discreet, of course, camouflaged and painless, so to speak, with a human face, but just as terrible and perhaps more pernicious. Whom is this acrobat Carrillo trying to kid when he claims that his party has put distance between itself and Moscow? Moscow, as we know, really asks for only one thing: unconditional servitude to its foreign policy. And on this essential point there is not a single issue on which the PCE is not strictly following the Kremlin's line. Of what good are its liberal proclamations and its betated discovery of formal freedom? This is and will be a joke, a sinister and tragic joke, as long as the party is incapable of cleaning up its own house, as long as it is unwilling to liberalize its internal workings, as long as it has not broken, for example, with the old Stalinoid practice of democratic centralism. Moreover, how can we believe in a man who lies so shamelessly about his own past and that of his party? How can we accord the slightest credit to a party head who, as all Spaniards know, has so much blood on his hands? The blood of Andres Nin, Juan Comorera, Gabriel Leon Trilla. Does this same Carrillo who was Madrid's number one policeman in the midst of Spain's war now want to make you believe in his fine liberal intentions? Does this same Carrillo, who not so long ago liquidated, without the slightest scruples, the anarchists, the POUM [Marxist Unification Workers Party] people, the dissidents in his own party, now pretend to play the moderate, the reformist, the Social Democrat perhaps? No, you cannot joke with the past, mock people's memories and traffic in the suffering and martyrdom of others. As long as the PCE's current leaders do not undertake the indispensable task of admitting their guilt, as long as they do not engage in what they themselves call "self-criticism," they will be the same brainless, amnesiac, aphasic servants of a single totalitarianism and an identical barbarism. You yourself have said so in your "Open Letter to Communist Party Members," and Semprun has also said so in his autobiography: Eurocommunism will continue to be a dream and an illusion as long as this work is not done.

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The Past "Boomerangs"

Arrabal: During the televised debate on Marxism the secretary general of the PCE asserted that both you and I "seem as if we would like to avenge our leftist past by attacking the PCE." What do you think?

Levy: Who was it that said that the bigger the lie, the better it works? How brazen! What audacity from a man whose public past is known to all! And while we are on this, let's recall some of the episodes from that past, particularly the way that Santiago Carrillo was able to travel from Belgium to the Soviet Union in 1939, passing through Nazi Germany, without being bothered in the slightest. His embarkation at a Baltic port was completely supervised by the police and Hitler's army. Strange, isn't it? This means that consciously or unconsciously, Carrillo was being protected by the Gestapo, that at a time when the Nazi cloud began to spread over Europe, he was able to cross the Europe of the time with total impunity. Strange, isn't it? It is even stranger if we recall how some years later the communist commands took their members and prisoners out of the concentration camps and coldly liquidated them, and how at the end of the 1940's the fact of having been in Auschwitz and Buchenwald became proof of collusion with Hitler and the reactionaries. Yes, let's talk about the past. Let's talk about all of those men and women who were miserably insulted as they left the death camps. Let's talk about Carrillo, who was mysteriously saved and then lashed out against the people who were on the verge of paying for their resistance to horror with their lives. What I am saying is nothing new; these are things, I repeat, that are perfectly well-known to all those who want to find out, even if the main people involved would rather shamefully cover all this up. In short, let me sum up by giving our bully a simple piece of advice: don't wield this argument about the past too much, because it could turn out to be double-edged and come back at you like a boomerang. Now that I have said this, you can be at ease, because I am not the sort of person who gets a morbid pleasure out of stoking up old ashes. I am not in favor of vendettas and purges. I am just firmly and simply saying that silence concerning the horrors of the past is always what enables people to continue making mistakes and committing horrors.

Arrabal: Marxism is a philosophy of submission, and Communist parties are the main parties of order. How can they still usurp the role of rebels and resisters?

Levy: Oh! That's very simple. Today's Communist leaders are, as I told you, traffickers, speculators on the misery and suffering of man, speculators on the martyrdom and heroism of their members,

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because the only undeniably true thing is that thousands, tens of thousands of Communists have indeed been heroic rebels. The fact is that among the rank-and-file, where the simple men and women are, the communist commitment has been for 40 years a way of opposing the shame of Francoism. Simply being a Communist was enough (I'm telling you nothing new) to risk jail or death. Today's party chieftains are collecting the dividends of all this. They are glorying today in this admirable tradition of rebelliousness. It is in the mortified flesh of those whom they sent to the slaughter, like Julian Grimau, that they are today so nobly wrapping themselves. You are right. They are really usurping a role. It is, at the same time, an insult to the memory of the dead and to the memory of their suffering. But our cannibals of misfortune do not care about one disgrace more or less, do they?

Arrabal: After 60 and 20 years of Marxist government in the USSR and Cuba, respectively, not even a tiny new critical study of Marxist thought has been done in either of the two countries. Why do the roots of their *raison d'être* harden into paralysis?

Levy: I do not agree at all. How can you forget the tremendous contribution of Marxist philosophy, its incredible practical and theoretical fecundity since 1917? For example, they invented the concentration camp, that radical novelty that Lenin established in 1919 when he wanted "to exterminate all of the harmful insects." In the 1930's they discovered a marvelous law, Stalin's law (just like we speak of Newton's law), whereby a state can be eliminated only by consolidating itself. And then there was the creation a little bit later of an admirable concept, with more unsuspected consequences and an extraordinary scope, the "concept of Stalinism" or the concept of the "personality cult," which was so handy (right?) in unburdening Marxism of all the crimes committed in its name and in convincing us that the "gulag" is, in reality, not just an unpleasant but a laughable accident of history. With Gramsci a new strategy was devised. A strategy is more than just something else! According to this strategy, it is not really necessary to take governmental power, when you can set up a small portable state, an individual mini-state, in each person's brain. This is the famous theory of hegemony. More recently yet, the great theoretician Leonid Brezhnev has also contributed his noble and worthy stone to the Marxist-Leninist edifice by removing the rust and exposing it to the fury of a discipline that had been forgotten. I am talking about psychiatry, probably psychoanalysis too, which has advantageously replaced concentration camps. Better still, Brezhnev, the decidedly undogmatic philosopher who is madly active even on the theoretical front, has rapidly invented a new mental illness with its own etiology and suitable remedies. I am talking about opposition.

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No, the heirs of Marx and Engels have not been resting. They have been worthy of their sacred founding fathers. Where can you see a hardening and a paralysis?

Arrabal: Why does Spain and its moral or intellectual "authorities" remain on the sidelines in all of the campaigns to help the victims of Marxist terror, as in Cambodia and Vietnam? Is it because of Marxist intimidation?

Levy: Naturally. Because if, according to Brezhnev, opposition is a mental illness, Marxism, in contrast, at times becomes a true disability; a person becomes deaf and blind to the brutal realities of suffering. When you are a Marxist, the first thing that you ask yourself in front of a charnel house is: "Is this a charnel house of rightists or leftists?" We are in perfect agreement with denouncing concentration camps and hangmen, but we immediately add: "Attention, comrade, there are hangmen and there are hangmen. Some are progressive and others are reactionary." In principle they are not against rescuing a Vietnamese in the China Sea, but before getting him out of the water, the dying person is asked where he comes from and to what camp he belongs, when the poor wretch only knows concentration camps by this time. I would only like the Spanish left, which in not so distant times gave evidence of a heroic anti-fascism, to realize this: no kind of socialism, no ideology, no generous, utopian or wonderful idea deserves to have 50 million scapegoats offered in sacrifice to it.

Arrabal: There is only one country with which Spain does not have diplomatic relations: Israel. I think that this is because of sovietization. What do you think?

Levy: Yes, just one country, like always! Once again Israel has become the Jew of nations, the universal outcast, the accursed nation of the international community. Spain, which is so indulgent with so many hangmen, does not seemingly tolerate any violation of human rights or democratic principles. How can we explain that Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, even Begin, are not, until a new command, neither Pinochet, nor Bokassa nor Amin Dada, all of them great humanists with whom Suarez's Spain maintains cordial diplomatic relations? First of all there is the tremendous blackmail that, as in the case of the Vietnamese and Cambodians, Soviet diplomacy can practice with the Spanish leadership class, with all of the mixed political classes. But perhaps, and this is much more serious, Spain has not been completely cured of a longstanding and ignoble malady called anti-Semitism.

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Arrabal: Why can black or Papuan legends, Greek or Scandinavian mythology be cited today in Spain, but no references made to the Bible or the Gospels without stupefying many people and sending sectarians into a frenzy?

Levy: For the same reason. The Bible is perhaps today the text with the worst reputation in the Western tradition. Our Judeo-Christian heritage is on the verge of becoming the blind point of our culture. There is a movement in France called the "new right," which instead of saying "I hate Jews" says "I hate Judeo-Christianity." It seems cleaner and more proper. But the substance is the same, fueled by the living sources of yesteryear's Nazi madness.

But the Bible, that accursed text that everyone abominates, contains a number of principles that we could return to today for thoughts about freedom, resistance and human rights. When I speak of resistance, I think about the prophets of the Old Testament, those who rebelled against all governments, all states, all kinds of oppression and especially about its text, that pure and simple text that deep down was their only homeland, their only anchor in the world and in which they simply read the command not to kill, to always respect people's rights and to reject barbarism.

I am not a believer, of course. Just like you, there is nothing that I hate more than churches. I have about as much trust in priests and devout churchgoers as in the plague. But I am convinced, however, that philosophers, politicians, the common people have not yet exhausted all of the resources of that text. And I am also convinced that if they want, they will find in it the most valuable norms of a philosophy of unmissiveness. That is the subject of my book "The Testament of God."

Being an Anti-Fascist

Arrabal: And how would you like Spain, the land of mystics and anarchists, conquerors and inquisitors, hangmen and Quixotes, to receive your book, which is a challenge hurled at the idolaters, the nihilists, the disenchanted, a reflection of morals worthy of man and built on the ruins of deadly ideologies, a hymn to unmissiveness in the face of totalitarianism?

Levy: "The Testament of God" is essentially a work about fascism. It poses just one question: What does it mean, today as yesterday, in 1979 as in 1939, to be a "total" anti-fascist? The book is based on the theory and concrete experiences of the anti-fascist struggle in the 20th century. It seems to directly concern Spain, to be directed at you Spaniards, who know better than anyone else what totalitarianism means. This book is waiting there for you, because

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you know a great deal about unsubmitiveness and revolution, exiled from yourselves for 40 years, heroic rebels under the heel of Franco and Stalin too. Deep down, I hope only for this: to be read and understood in the light of a libertarian, anarchist and non-violent tradition, and also on the path of this young democracy, of this great democratic hope that was born with the end of the previous regime and that must urgently, now more than ever, be consolidated.

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COUNTRY SECTION

UNITED KINGDOM

'THE GUARDIAN' SUPPORTS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO

LD141453 London THE GUARDIAN in English 14 Dec 79 p 12 LD--FOUO

[Editorial: "Mr Begin Is Wrong To Be Hostile"]

[Text] Mr Menachem Begin has been seriously perturbed by what he detects as a change in the British attitude to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Sir Ian Gilmour, the deputy foreign secretary, had a social meeting with a senior PLO representative in London last week. Mr Douglas Hurd, minister of state at the Foreign Office, has now described during a visit to Israel a change which he sees in the PLO's policy away from force and towards diplomacy to secure a state on the West Bank. Mr Hurd was presumably referring in part to a speech in London last week by Mr Khalid Hasan of the PLO. Mr Hasan said that a mini-state comprising Gaza and the West Bank would now be acceptable to the PLO as a first stage in the "peaceful and democratic" reunification of Palestine embracing Muslims, Christians and Jews.

In the first place, neither Mr Begin nor anyone else in the Israeli Government wants peaceful and democratic reunification on unspecified terms. In the second place, they will have serious doubts about Mr Hasan's ability to speak for the whole spectrum of Arab opinion contained in the PLO, which runs from the infra-red and footloose guerrilla to the ultra-violet and resourceful diplomat.

It is possible to be strongly pro-Palestinian without being anti-Israel, but that subtlety is not easy to put across in Jerusalem. The Israelis now have a much bigger state, even without the occupied territories, than was awarded to them by the United Nations. The Palestinian Arabs, who were the indigenous people of the country, have no state at all. To correct this historic injustice to the Arabs does not entail injustice to the Israelis.

The PLO has been its own worst enemy, in the West at least, because of the deadly methods and inflammatory language by which it has always asserted Palestinian rights. As long as terrorism was the approved method (as it is in the Palestinian Charter) it had to be assumed that any state created by the PLO would be a terrorist state. Israeli statesmen have therefore found it easy to dismiss the Palestinians' rightful claims when sensible

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diplomacy would have tried to make it hard for them. The more moderate the PLO's methods become, the greater will be the pressure on Israel from the United States and Western Europe.

The PLO will still have a choice to make. It can go for what is historically justified but also totally impracticable--a non-sectarian Palestine. Or it can compromise some of the rights of the Palestinians for the sake of a system that works. That seems to be the present inclination. The mini-state could well be federated with Israel (and Jordan) leaving Jerusalem a united city and the capital of both. Arab claims to return to the whole of mandatory Palestine would not be met that way; but a limit would be placed on the size of Israeli territory. The principle of partition as accepted by the UN, though more favourable in practice to the Israelis, would be met.

Mr. Hurd was doing no more than any British Government should do in advocating the Palestinian case. It ought still to be possible for Britain and the other members of the EEC to link the Israeli-Egyptian treaty with a state for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The treaty is far too valuable to be left unprotected, but without satisfaction of the Palestinian claims it will become more and more vulnerable. It has already transformed relations between Israelis and Egyptians at the official level and could soon do so at the personal level. That is a positive gain. But as long as it appears to leave the Palestinians out of account, it cannot succeed in what it sets out to do, and that is to expand the area of peace in the Middle East. Therefore, the Palestinians must be accommodated, and that means meeting the PLO. If they are not careful, the Israelis could look back this time next year to the golden era when Yasir 'Arafat was in charge instead of his extremist successor. If the present avowals of moderation by the PLO are not examined by Israel, they could soon be heard no more.

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COUNTRY SECTION

UNITED KINGDOM

'FINANCIAL TIMES' COMMENTS ON EEC BUDGET REJECTION

LD141451 London THE FINANCIAL TIMES in English 14 Dec 79 p 20 DL

[Editorial: "A New Power in the EEC"]

[Text] It was always inevitable that a directly elected European Parliament would attempt to exercise more power in the running of the community than its predecessors, which were merely delegates from national parliaments. It was not inevitable that it should move so rapidly and so dramatically to the centre of the European stage as it has just done, by rejecting the 1980 community budget in toto. That was made inevitable by the refusal of the Council of Ministers to accept the rather limited modifications to the budget put forward by the parliament a few weeks ago, and by its continued refusal to offer adequate concessions on Wednesday night to the parliament's sense of its democratic legitimacy.

Constructive

In one sense, this could be a dangerous development; in another, it could also prove extremely constructive. Dangerous, because the vote in Strasbourg has obviously been conducted in an atmosphere of suspicion and anger. The council appears to have been rejecting the demands of the parliament, less for what they are than because of what they may represent in the balance of power between the two institutions; conversely, the parliament has decided to take a yard precisely because the council refused to give an inch.

Both sides must learn from this experience. The parliament is entitled to throw out the budget lock, stock and barrel, and it has shown that it is prepared to use this power. But it is a crude form of power, and parliament must know that it must be used judiciously. At the same time, the Council of Ministers will now have to reckon with the fact that it must take more notice of the directly elected representatives of the European voters, and should frame its policies with more regard for the parliament than it has hitherto done.

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Principle

The fact that the community will be without a proper budget for the next few months is not very serious. The situation will only turn into a crisis if the governments--and this means in particular the French Government--attempt to make an issue of principle of the rights of parliament.

The strength of the directly elected parliament is not that it has particular budgetary powers, but that it is more truly representative than the ministers who meet in council, since they represent only the parliamentary majorities of their national capitals. This is particularly true in respect of the farm policy, since decisions there are taken by farm ministers who, in most cases, represent only the interests of farmers, and not those of consumers or taxpayers.

The parliament, by contrast, represents the community at large, and is by definition more representative of non-farming interests. The parliament's position comes under two different chapter headings: it wants a cut in the cost of common agricultural policy, and it wants an increase in community spending on such items as regional and energy policies. These two chapters should not be given equal weight in any assessment of yesterday's vote.

Expensive

The common agricultural policy is absurd, and outrageously expensive. Until yesterday, this cost was merely the haphazard outcome of politically determined price increases by farm ministers. If the vote forces the farm ministers to reconsider not merely their attitudes to pricing but even to the fundamental rationale of the cap, that will be a major step forward.

On the other hand, the parliament cannot hope, as a large and unwieldy body, to devise new directions in which the community should go; that is the task of the commission and the council. The parliament's preferences for regional and energy policies may well be constructive in intention, but it does not add up to a coherent policy. With luck, the parliamentary vote should force the member states to rethink a number of important issues, starting with the farm policy and the British budgetary contribution, and going on to the more general question of the future thrust of community policy.

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COUNTRY SECTION

UNITED KINGDOM

U.S. MILITARY VIEWED AS OBSTACLE TO TEST BAN TREATY

LD141455 London THE TIMES in English 14 Dec 79 p 14 LD

[Report by Henry Stanhope: "Will the Test Ban Treaty Ever Be Signed"]

[Text] Another session of the Geneva negotiations over a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) has just ended without any significant advance. This is disappointing because the British, American and Soviet delegations made such a promising start more than two years ago. But it is also very worrying because after a year of virtual stagnation, there is a very real fear that a treaty may never be signed.

A partial test ban treaty (PTBT) was signed by the same three powers in 1963. This prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and since then all have been conducted underground. France and China, who did not have the facilities, refused to join in--although all French tests too have been carried out underground since their new site was opened in 1975.

In 1974 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the threshold test ban treaty (TTBT) which prohibited underground tests of more than 150 kilotons yield--equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT. They also promised to keep their testing to a minimum, without specifying what this might be.

However there has long been a case for banning tests altogether. For one thing we know little about the long-term effects of underground nuclear explosions. For another, total prohibition might help to inhibit the continuous advance in weapon technology, which serves only to complicate negotiations over arms control. A third argument is that some form of self-denial by the big powers is necessary to persuade non-nuclear weapon states to stay that way. The second review conference of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) is due next summer, and the big three badly need something to boast about by then.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in its 1979 yearbook, records 1,165 nuclear explosions between 1945 and 1978, as many as 667 of them since the PTBT was signed in 1963. Most were designed to improve the

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efficiency of weapons, and more than 90 per cent were carried out by the three powers now working for a CTBT, although Britain's share was relatively small. Between 1976 and 1978 the Russians detonated 60, the American 37, the French 16, the Chinese 8 and the British only 3. In 1978 the Soviets actually conducted more tests than in any single year since 1963, four years after signing the TTBT in which they promised to keep to a "minimum."

Yet, after the CTBT talks opened, the Soviets made some startling concessions. They agreed that peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) would be covered by the treaty (these are supposedly for civil engineering purposes), and even accepted the principle of on-site inspection as part of the provisions to verify compliance with the ban.

They even agreed to have 10 seismic stations installed in their territory. Seismic stations are boreholes containing sensitive instruments which can detect and identify underground explosions, even those of very low yield. Any information could then be transmitted to the other powers, probably by simultaneous satellite transmission. The Americans agreed to have 10 also--although they wryly observed that the American media would do the job just as well.

Then the Russians threw a spanner in the works by insisting that Britain should accommodate 10 also. Britain refused on the grounds that as all its tests were carried out at the American underground site in Nevada, this would be absurd. Then the Soviets shifted their stance and demanded that nine of them should be scattered round the world in British dependencies, including the sensitive locations of Hong Kong and the Falkland Isles. Britain still refused--pointing out in passing that at least two of the chosen sites were no longer dependent anyway. All that is has offered is one seismic station at an existing site at Eskdalemuir--which they argue is more than enough if verification of the CTBT is all the Russians are after. Each site would cost up to 3 million pounds to install and about 50,000 pounds a year to maintain, although the cost is not an important factor.

The continuing dispute over seismic stations however is only one of several factors which held up progress, and not the most important. There are for instance difficulties over how much detail to work out before presenting the treaty for signature by other powers, and over provisions for renewing it after the three-year moratorium on testing which it will introduce, has expired.

But the most serious obstacle remains opposition to it in the United States, among the military for instance, where critics think a ban might see American technological superiority eroded--particularly if the Russians cheat. (The verification measures, they insist, are not sufficient guarantee). It was to placate such critics that the length of treaty has been limited to three years. They also point out that without testing of any kind, the efficiency of stockpiled weapons could not be monitored.

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These are highly controversial arguments, and President Carter remains deeply committed to the CTBT. But the President is already in difficulties over SALT-II, and is understandably reluctant to confront Congress with a still more explosive issue. It has already been said that President Carter could not hope to get the Panama Treaty, SALT-II and CTBT past Congress during his presidency. Two out of three was the most he could hope for--and the Panama Treaty has already gone through.

So the Americans are reluctant to push ahead very fast with CTBT just now--and the Russians, also obsessed by SALT-II, seem in no hurry either. But as the SALT-II debate in Congress draws further away, and the next presidential election draws nearer, what are the hopes for a treaty? Edward Kennedy if elected would share Carter's commitment to it. But would a Republican like, say, Ronald Reagan? Some Americans are already saying that a CTBT is a lost cause for the time being--and the "time being" could last a very long time.

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